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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULEMAKING: NEW
PATTERNS AND NEW PROBLEMS*
FREDERICK DAVIS**
The principles that govern judicial power in reviewing challenged
administrative rules have never been fully resolved or established.'
Recent regulatory statutes, particularly the post-1970 pollution control
efforts,2 display differences and contradictions regarding the availabil-
ity and scope of judicial review that have taxed the analytical capacities
of scholars,3 lawyers,4 and judges. 5 This article discusses the various
statutory patterns of rulemaking review and concludes that the regula-
tory legislation reflects five distinct patterns. Once these patterns are
identified and described, it is possible to explore and appraise the seri-
ous problems that confront judges called upon to review rules adopted
under legislation that requires judicial review pursuant to one of these
five patterns. The article focuses on statutes providing for pre-enforce-
* This article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United States. The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of
the Administrative Conference.
** Dean, University of Dayton School of Law. A.B. 1948, Yale University; J.D. with
specialization in international affairs 1953, Cornell University; LL.M. 1955, Victoria University of
Wellington (N.Z.). Member, New York and Missouri Bars.
1. For an illuminating analysis of the policies and practical considerations bearing upon the
roles of agencies and courts in the rulemaking process, see DeLong, InformalRulemaking andthe
Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979). For insightful discussions of the
problems directly related to judicial review of agency rulemaking, see Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974); Note, Judicial Review of 4gency Rule Making, 14
GA. L. REv. 300 (1980).
2. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1976); Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4915 (1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1976); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. 11 1978).
3. See, e.g., Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationsip, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
15, 26-30 (1977); Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IowA L. REv. 1221
(1977).
4. Consider the solution Judge McGowan proposed for the perplexed attorneys in Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1977):
If any doubt as to the proper forum exists, careful counsel should file suit in both the
court of appeals and the district court.... This suggestion is hardly unprecedented; the
plaintiffs in Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, [379 U.S. 411 (1965),]...
were able to protect their rights by following the double-filing procedure.
5. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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ment review of rules and the problems these statutes create concerning
the availability of additional review in enforcement proceedings.6
The current problems and concerns about the judicial role in re-
viewing federal administrative rules are, to a great extent, related to the
watershed case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.7 In that case the
Supreme Court endorsed the presumption of reviewability of agency
action, absent" 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent.' 8 The Court also held that pre-enforcement judicial review of
administrative rules was to be available if the challenging party could
make a showing of conspicuous hardship. 9 This holding made review
available to many challenges previously denied review on the ground
that the action was not ripe for review. By accepting the idea that pre-
enforcement judicial review of administrative rules is neither aberrant
nor unauthorized, the Abbott Laboratories Court paved the way for the
widespread statutory use of pre-enforcement judicial review, and for
the creation of the different modes of statutory review with which this
article is concerned.' 0
I. PATTERNS OF STATUTES GOVERNING REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
A close study of the legislation governing rulemaking review
reveals that there are five patterns of statutes:"
6. No attempt is made here to coordinate the scope and intensity ofjudicial review with the
procedural qualities of the rulemaking process that generated the rules. This difficult problem is
addressed in two thought-provoking and thoroughly developed articles by Professor Daniel Gif-
ford. Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm, 32
ADMIN. L. REv. 577 (1980); Gifford, Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some Con-
ceptualModels, 65 MINN. L. REv. 63 (1980).
7. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The case is sometimes referred to as the "every time case" because
the major rules at issue required pharmaceutical manufacturers to print the generic name of a
drug every time the trade name of the drug appeared on the manufacturers' labels or other printed
material. Id. at 138-39.
8. Id. at 141.
9. Id. at 153-54.
10. Significantly, this statutory trend came only in the wake of the Abbott Laboratories deci-
sion. See Appendix, infra. The majority opinion appears not to have foreseen this development.
Even Mr. Justice Fortas's lengthy and prophetic dissent, which emphasized the disruptive effect
that pre-enforcement review can have on a vital regulatory program, does not deal with the forum
choice complexities and other embarrassments that can result from permitting different modes of
review at different points in time. 387 U.S. at 174-201 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Those who com-
mented on the case also failed to anticipate the congressional response. See The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 110, 225-31 (1967); 52 MINN. L. REv. 872 (1968).
11. See Appendix, infra, for a selected list of statutes by category.
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(1) Legislation that confers rulemaking power on the agency but
makes no provision for or reference to judicial review;12
(2) Legislation that provides for judicial review in federal district
court but establishes no time limit within which review must be
sought;' 3
(3) Legislation that provides for direct pre-enforcement review
within a prescribed time period after promulgation and explicitly pre-
serves the jurisdiction of the appropriate court to review the validity of
regulations after the prescribed period in enforcement proceedings;14
(4) Legislation that provides for direct pre-enforcement review
within a prescribed time period following promulgation but is silent
about the availability of review in enforcement proceedings or other-
wise;15 and
(5) Legislation that provides for direct pre-enforcement review
within a prescribed time period and prohibits, except under limited
conditions, review of the rule in an enforcement proceeding. t6
Pattern 1 is quite common, and does not involve serious problems
regarding the appropriate forum or form of proceeding for review.' 7
Congressional silence on the procedures for judicial review automati-
cally invokes the non-statutory review procedures analyzed in the Ab-
boll Laboratories case.' 8 This first type of rule is reviewable in the
12. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. 11 1978) (conferring power on the Office of Personnel
Management to prescribe and enforce various types of regulations for the administration of the
provisions of Title 5, but making no mention of any special judicial review procedures); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1902 (1976) (conferring rulemaking power upon the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System under the National Credit Union Central Liquidity Facility Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976)
(conferring rulemaking authority on the Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
the Treasury to "make and publish such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the efficient
administration of the functions with which each is charged under this chapter").
13. See, e.g., Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7192(g) (Supp. 11 1978)
(conferring power upon the district courts of the United States to resolve cases or controversies
arising "under rules, regulations, or orders" issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion).
14. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (1976).
15. The pre-enforcement review may be in the court of appeals or in the district court. The
most notable of the legislative provisions imposing court-of-appeals review within a prescribed
time period is the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1976), as amended
by Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (Supp. 111978). The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1374(d)(6) (1976), provides for pre-enforcement review in the district courts.
16. E.g., Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (Supp. II
1978), and statutes cited in note 2 supra.
17. K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TExT-PROBLEMS 171 (6th ed. 1977).
18. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139 (1966).
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district court. 19 Injunction and declaratory judgment, the traditional
non-statutory forms of judicial review, are the appropriate methods of
review for such rules.20 Recent decisions have considered the issues of
the availability and timing of review in classification (1) cases by focus-
ing on how substantial the administrative pronouncement's impact is
upon a particular person or a discrete class of persons.2'
In a typical pattern 2 statute, Congress provides for district court
review of rules but imposes no time limits or other special conditions
varying the conditions of review. 22 Pattern 2 thus differs from pattern 1
only in that in limited situations there may be some doubt ab6ut the
reviewability of a rule promulgated under a pattern 1 statute. If Con-
gress has declared the rules subject to judicial review, as it does under
those situations covered by classification (2), the ambiguity disappears.
In pattern 3 statutes, Congress explicitly provides for both pre-en-
forcement review of rules and review as part of enforcement proceed-
ings. Thus, pattern 3 statutes do not present serious questions about
the availability of review. They do, however, differ from statutes in
patterns 4 and 5, which provide for pre-enforcement review but either
say nothing about the availability of additional review or purport to
foreclose such review. We now turn to the problems created by these
statutes.
II. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CONGRESSIONAL PRESCRIPTION OF A
LIMITED TIME PERIOD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES
A. Pattern 4. A Prescribed Time Period is Establishedjor Pre-
enforcement Review, but the Statute is Silent about Review
in Enforcement Proceedings.
Statutes that provide a specific procedure for pre-enforcement re-
view within a prescribed time period, without indicating whether that
procedure is exclusive, put interpretative responsibilities of considera-
ble complexity upon the federal judiciary. Under these circumstances
courts have held either that the normal rules governing judicial review
in enforcement proceedings and in other proceedings outside the pre-
scribed time period still apply;23 or that, by implication, review outside
19. W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
921 (7th ed. 1979).
20. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 444-46 (3d ed. 1972).
21. See, eg., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 536 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1976).
22. See, e.g., Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7192 (Supp. 11 1978).
23. See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952); Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1952).
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the prescribed pre-enforcement time period is barred;24 or that review
outside the time period is available but more restricted than usual.25
City of Rochester v. Bond 26 illustrates the view that a statute pro-
viding only for pre-enforcement review bars additional review. The
case involved review of the Federal Aviation Administration's determi-
nation that a proposed six-hundred-foot radio antenna tower near an
airport would not be a hazard. The Rochester City Council, instead of
seeking review within sixty days in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit,27 filed suit nine months later in district court to
have the agency's determination set aside. The district court dismissed
the suit and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding:
Congress acting within its constitutional powers, may freely choose
the court in which judicial review may occur. In the absence of a
statute prescribing review in a particular court, "non-statutory" re-
view may be sought in district court under any applicable jurisdic-
tional grant. If, however, there exists a special statutory review
procedure, it is ordinarily supposed that Congress intended that pro-
cedure to be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in those
cases to which it applies. 28
The court stated that additional review procedures might be avail-
able in exceptional circumstances but did not find such circumstances
present in the case at bar.29
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission30 and National Industrial Constructors v. Occupational
24. See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. 411, 425 (1965); United
States v. Bodine Produce Co., 206 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D. Ariz. 1962).
25. Eg., Byrd v. United States, 154 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1946) (when limited judicial review
is available, a rule may be collaterally attacked in a condemnation proceeding only upon constitu-
tional grounds).
26. 603 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
27. The order was reviewable under both the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)
(30 days), and the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976) (60 days).
28. 603 F.2d at 931.
29. Id. at 935-39. This exception, which resembles exceptions to the exhaustion-of-
administrative-remedies doctrine and the final-order doctrine, suggests that the Bond court's hold-
ing rests on principles ofjudicial administration rather than on statutory interpretation. See gener-
ally FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980) (denying review); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184 (1958) (granting review). Additional review might be deemed unavailable in classification (4)
cases as a matter of Congressional intent since Congress did not expressly provide for additional
review as it did in classification (3) statutes. This construction would follow from a literal applica-
tion of the so-called "expressio unius" rule, but the Supreme Court has not been inclined to give a
literal enforcement of that rule in other contexts. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4 (1942). Application of the rule in interpreting these statutes is particularly inappropri-
ate because of the existence of statutes expressly providing review in enforcement proceedings
(classification (3)) as well as statutes expressly forbidding review outside of pre-enforcement pro-
ceedings (classification (5)).
30. 534 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Safety & Health Review Commission3' held that the substantive validity
of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations can be
challenged in an enforcement action. Challenges to the procedures
used in adopting the regulation, however, will be allowed only during
pre-enforcement review.32
The substantive-procedural distinction drawn in National Indus-
trial Constructors and Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores has a surface logic. A
purely technical shortcoming in the process of promulgation should not
be the basis for setting aside an otherwise legitimate regulatory pro-
gram authorized by Congress. The time for dealing with such deficien-
cies is during the period of pre-enforcement review. Yet the distinction
between substantive and procedural matters may be slippery.33 The
failure to comply with a procedural requirement might result in the
promulgation of a rule whose substantive validity is so questionable
that an appellant, clearly aggrieved by the application of the rule in an
enforcement proceeding, ought to be permitted to raise it even though
Congress had provided for pre-enforcement judicial review during a
prescribed period.
This problem is illustrated by United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Products Corp.34 In that case the Food and Drug Administration
promulgated, without making available for notice and comment the
scientific data it relied on, regulations governing the proper time, tem-
perature, and salinity for the process of smoking fish. 35 Five years later
the agency brought an enforcement proceeding against Nova Scotia,
which contended that whitefish processed in conformity with the regu-
lation would be commercially unsalable. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit declared the regulation invalid. The court accepted the
company's argument that the agency's failure to disclose the scientific
31. 583 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1978).
32. Id. at 1052-53; 534 F.2d at 551-52. But see Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d
1094, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1980). Although the Atlantic Guff Stevedores opinion is phrased in terms
of burden of proof, the result is that the petitioner may not rely on mere procedural irregularities
in the promulgation of the regulation without establishing an aggrieving substantive effect. 534
F.2d at 551-52.
33. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's classic description of the substantive-procedural distinction
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) and questions raised in P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 728-29 (2d ed. 1973).
34. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). The statute in Nova Scotia did not explicitly provide for pre-
enforcement review but the liberal non-statutory pre-enforcement review authorized by Abbott
Laboratories made the rule eligible for virtually the same pre-enforcement review. Thus, the
court likely would have reached the same result had the case involved a true classification (4)
statute.
35. 34 Fed. Reg. 17,176 (1969).
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data it relied on rendered impossible any effective criticism of the
methodology and interpretation of the data.36
The holding of Nova Scotia suggests that when the procedural de-
ficiency appears so substantial that it raises doubts about the substan-
tive validity of the rule, and the objector can point to significant
aggrievement directly related thereto, the courts should allow the ob-
jector to challenge the validity of the rule despite the deficiency's proce-
dural character and despite the lapse of a significant period of time
after promulgation of the rule.37
B. Pattern 5. A Specftc Time Period is Prescribed by Statute for Pre-
enforcement Review with a Prohibition against Enforcement
Review Outside that Time Period except under
Limited Conditions.
Pattern 5, which explicitly cuts off the availability of review, is the
most controversial of the classifications under consideration. Varia-
tions of the formula appear in at least five statutes, including the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 197738 and the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act.39 These five statutes provide for pre-enforcement review, usu-
ally in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
within sixty or ninety days after promulgation of the regulation in
question.40 After that period the regulation is generally incontestable.
36. 568 F.2d at 251.
37. The key criteria that affect the availability of judicial review outside the limited period of
pre-enforcement review are similar to those considerations that determine whether an objector to
administrative action should be excused from complying with the exhaustion-of-administrative-
remedies rule-namely, (1) degree of aggrievement; (2) degree of facial illegality; and (3) non-
embarrassment of the regulatory goals as a result of the judicial review. See Lone Star Cement
Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1964); K. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 69
(1958).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. 111978).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1976). See also Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30
U.S.C. § 811 (Supp. I 1978); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4915 (1976); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1976); Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976), as amended, (Supp.
I 1978).
40. Deciding when the rule has been promulgated for purposes of defining the pre-enforce-
ment review period has presented difficult construction problems. For example, in Independent
Cosmetic Mfrs. v. Department of HEW, 574 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the petitioner did not file
its petition for review within the ninety-day period following the initial promulgation of the con-
tested rule-an FDA labeling regulation. The petitioner argued, however, that the possibility of
further amendments from the suggestions of other parties prevented an immediate determination
of the rule's impact. Thus, the review period should have commenced sometime after the initial
promulgation of the rule. The court nevertheless held the petition barred. Id. at 559. Judge
Wilkey filed a twenty-two page dissent in which he argued that the ninety-day period should not
have begun before the date the agency responded to objections made to the regulation as origi-
nally promulgated. Before that date, according to Judge Wilkey, the petitioner could not detei-
mine that it would be adversely affected by the regulation. Any judicial challenge it made prior to
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Four of the statutes contain a single exception allowing review if the
petition for review is based on grounds arising after the pre-enforce-
ment review period.41 The goal of these statutes is to minimize the
delays and uncertainties in the administrative implementation of pollu-
tion control programs that can result from the numerous and geograph-
ically diversified judicial challenges. The constitutionality of the
particular review provisions, however, is not free from doubt.
The current pattern 5 statutes are modeled after a controversial
World War II act sharply limiting the opportunity of aggrieved persons
to challenge judicially the validity of regulations issued pursuant to the
Emergency Price Control Act.42 The Supreme Court upheld the re-
view-limiting provisions against a due-process challenge in Yakus v.
United States.43 As long as the statute provided "an adequate opportu-
nity to be heard on the question of validity,"44 which the Court found it
did through pre-enforcement review, the preclusion of challenges in en-
forcement proceedings was permissible. 45 Justice Rutledge argued in
dissent that to prevent challenges to the validity of regulations would
give the regulations a greater immunity from judicial review than the
that date, therefore, would be found unripe for review. Id. at 580. For other cases involving the
question of when a rule is promulgated, see Laminators Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d
965, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
41. Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4915(a) (1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(1) (1976); Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). This limiting phrase seems to have been
taken from a World War II statute limiting the grounds upon which price and rent control regula-
tions might be attacked. See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat.
23, 31-33 (1942) (amended 1944).
To fall under the exception, the imperfection arising after the expiration of the time period
must be one that would have been considered disabling during the prescriptive period of pre-
enforcement review. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1976). In other words, when
Congress authorized judicial review in enforcement proceedings of rules based upon grounds aris-
ing after the prescriptive period had expired, it did not intend to enlarge the scope of review
beyond that given to the courts during the period ofpre-enforcement review. At least one court of
appeals has held that the imperfection arising after the expiration of the prescriptive period of
review must be based upon technological or scientific developments, not on changes in the law.
See American Ass'n of Meat Processors.v. Costle, 556 F.2d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1977).
42. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §§ 203(a), 204(d), Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat.
23, 31-33 (1942) (amended 1944). The Act created an Emergency Court of Appeals with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals of challenges to the validity of the regulations. Persons objecting to a
regulation were required to file a protest with the Price Administrator within sixty days after the
regulation was issued and appeal to the Emergency Court within thirty days after the denial of the
protest.
43. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
44. Id. at 446.
45. Id. The Court reserved the question of whether facial unconstitutionality of a regulation
could be asserted in an enforcement proceeding. Id. at 446-47.
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statutes under which they were promulgated:46 "At a time when ad-
ministrative action assumes more and more of the law-making func-
tion, it would seem the balance of advantage, if any, should be the
other way .... Clearly Congress could not require judicial enforce-
ment of an unconstitutional statute. The same is true of an unconstitu-
tional regulation."47
Courts presented with cases questioning the continuing validity of
Yakus have avoided the issue, primarily by characterizing the adminis-
trative pronouncement or action being challenged as outside the statu-
tory authority granting immunity from challenges. InAdamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States48 the challenged statute granted Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) emission standards immunity from review in
enforcement proceedings.49 The EPA promulgated a rule requiring
buildings to be sprayed with water before demolition. When the
wrecking company challenged the rule in an enforcement proceeding,
the Supreme Court held that the rule was a "work-practice standard"
and not an "emission standard." 50 The rule was therefore not eligible
for the incontestable status the statute conferred upon emission stan-
dards. Justice Powell wrote a short concurring opinion in which he
speculated that, had the Court reached the question of the validity of
the incontestability clause, it might have limited Yakus by viewing the
Emergency Price Control Act as an exercise of congressional war pow-
ers. Under such a view, Justice Powell believed, the EPA incontestabil-
ity clause would have been struck down.51
In Chrysler Corp. v. EP,4 52 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit interpreted narrowly the special statutory review
procedure of the Noise Control Act of 1972,53 to avoid foreclosing en-
46. Id. at 468-69 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 469 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
48. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. 11 1978).
50. 434 U.S. at 289.
51. Although the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone is not free from ambiguity, there is
language emphasizing that the price controls imposed by the Congress were a "war
emergency measure." Indeed, the Government argued that the statute should be upheld
under the war powers authority of Congress. . . . As important as environmental con-
cerns are to the country, they are not comparable-im terms of an emergency justifying
the shortcutting of normal due process rights--to the need for national mobilization in
wartime of economic as well as military activity. ... Indeed, following Yakus, and
apparently concerned by Mr. Justice Rutledge's eloquent dissent, Congress amended the
most onerous features of the Emergency Price Control Act.
Id. at 290-91 (Powell, J., concurring). Professor David Currie anticipated Justice Powell's opinion
in a 1977 law review article criticizing the application of the Yakus rule in environmental cases.
Currie, supra note 3, at 1259.
52. 600 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4915 (1976).
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forcement review of a large number of rules.54 The court noted the
possible unfairness of foreclosing review, the recommendation of the
Administrative Conference of the United States that invalidity be a de-
fense in an enforcement proceeding, 55 and Justice Powell's suggestion
that due process might not justify incontestability outside a wartime
setting.5 6
Should a case arise in which it is clear that Congress has foreclosed
review, the Supreme Court will not be able to avoid deciding the deli-
cate constitutional issue that the review-denial language of the statute
poses. Whether the rule-incontestability provisions of the current envi-
ronmental statutes satisfy due process must be decided by referring to
Mathews v. Eldridge.5 7 The Mathews test determines the sufficiency of
a procedure by examining three criteria: (1) the private interest af-
fected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through
the current procedure and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards; and (3) the nature of the government's interest.58
The weight assigned to the first criterion-the affected private in-
terest-will vary depending upon the nature of the case. A marginal
economic effect on the person against whom an administrative rule is
sought to be enforced probably does not constitute a sufficient interest
to surmount the congressionally established policy against enforcement
review. But when a party alleges that enforcement of a rule would seri-
ously impair the economic health of, or destroy, a multi-million dollar
industry, a judge will have difficulty denying the objector the opportu-
nity to assert in enforcement proceedings that the rule is invalid.5 9
With respect to the nature of the private interests affected, a compari-
son of Yakus with cases that may arise under current environmental
statutes must consider the different enforcement programs involved.
54. 600 F.2d at 912.
55. The recommendation appears at 41 Fed. Reg. 56,768 (1976).
56. 600 F.2d at 913 (citing 434 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring)). The problems the courts
face in deciding which administrative pronouncements are incontestable under the new statutes
creating such incontestability are similar to the problems of deciding which administrative pro-
nouncements are "orders" reviewable in the courts of appeal under statutory provisions such as
the Hobbs Act, and which pronouncements are reviewable only in the federal district courts. See,
eg., Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980); Sima Products Corp. v. McLucas, 612 F.2d 309
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980). United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved a challenge to the Social Security Administra-
tion's procedure of terminating disability benefits without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court enunciated a three-part balancing test for analyzing due process cases, id. at
335, and held that the post-termination hearing provided by the agency satisfied due process, id. at
349.
58. Id. at 334-35.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Yakus involved criminal penalties against individuals who violated the
regulations. Although cases arising under the environmental statutes
conceivably could produce contempt citations, a conventional criminal
prosecution will not normally result from an enforcement proceeding.
Because personal liberty is one of the most highly valued interests that
the Supreme Court recognizes in applying the Mathews v. Eldridge
test,60 a court might uphold the incontestability provisions of the envi-
ronmental statutes because of the absence of criminal penalties.
Whether such a distinction would be decisive remains to be seen, of
course, but it is certainly a factor to consider.
The risk that foreclosing review of rules beyond a limited time will
erroneously deprive the affected party of its interest-the second Ma-
thews criterion-is great. Several obstacles may prevent an affected
party from participating in the limited pre-enforcement review and
thus cause it to have no opportunity to challenge the regulation. For
example, persons may not have notice of the regulation when pre-en-
forcement review is available. As Justice Powell noted in his Adamo
concurrence, typically the only notice of the promulgation of a regula-
tion is publication in the Federal Register. 61 Although large corpora-
tions may have the resources necessary to monitor the register,
individuals and small firms may not be able to afford this expense and
may not even be aware of or have access to the register.62 Even if a
person has notice of a regulation, he may not become aware of a defect
in the regulation, or of how the regulation affects him, until after the
time for pre-enforcement review expires. 63 Professor David Currie,
discussing the Clean Air Act, has pointed out that the statute "even
appears to make invalidity unavailable as a defense [in an enforcement
proceeding] to persons who went into the affected business, moved into
the affected area, or indeed were born after the thirty-day or ninety-day
period."64
The third criterion in the Mathews v. Eldridge test is the nature of
the government interest. The distinction between the provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act upheld in Yakus and the current incon-
testability clauses contained in environmental statutes is most evident
with respect to this criterion. Congress's concern that its environmental
60. 424 U.S. at 341; Sf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
61. 434 U.S. at 289 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring); Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 904, 912-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 904, 913 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Independent
Cosmetic Mfrs. v. Department of HEW, 574 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893
(1980).
64. Currie, supra note 3, at 1258.
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programs not be paralyzed by a plethora of law suits and legal maneu-
vers is surely a legitimate one.65 But as Justice Powell indicated, "As
important as environmental concerns are to the country, they are not
comparable-in terms of an emergency justifying the shortcutting of
normal due process rights-to the need for national mobilization in
wartime of economic as well as military activity. '66
The less compelling government interest in the environmental stat-
utes, coupled with the great danger of foreclosing judicial review alto-
gether with barriers to pre-enforcement review, suggests that the
constitutionality of the current review-limiting statutes is problemati-
cal.67 This situation suggests the need to examine alternatives to the
total foreclosure of challenges to the validity of regulations beyond the
statutory review period.
III. Two PROPOSALS FOR SOFTENING THE HARSH AND PRE-
EMPTIVE EFFECTS OF THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSES
Should Congress continue to make administrative rules incontest-
able in enforcement proceedings when there has been a limited period
made available for pre-enforcement review, two devices may take some
of the sting out of the injustice that the application of such foreclosure
65. See Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1974) ("The time limit is
not arbitrary but is designed to get issues resolved promptly and thereby prevent delay in cleaning
the air").
66. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
67. The danger of foreclosing all opportunity for review is heightened by the fact that a court
may prevent a petitioner from taking part in a pre-enforcement challenge to the validity of a
regulation by finding that the petitioner fails to satisfy requirements of standing and ripeness.
Decisions using these doctrines to limit the availability of pre-enforcement review risk shipwreck-
ing an innocent party between the Scylla of standing and the Charybdis of incontestability. See
Independent Cosmetic Mfrs. v. Department of HEW, 574 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerl. denied,
439 U.S. 893 (1980).
Cases struggling with the subtleties of standing and ripeness issues include Council of Forest
Indus. v. ICC, 570 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 536 F.2d 156
(7th Cir. 1976). Some courts, in determining the availability ofpre-enforcement review, are influ-
enced by whether the party seeking review failed to participate in the administrative processes
leading to the formulation of the rule. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 509 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1975); Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii
260, 264, 535 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1975) ("It is not enough that a person has been 'aggrieved' by
agency action. He must also have contested the issue before the agency"); Annot., 36 A.L.R. FuD.
349, 353-59 (1978). One who fails to participate in the proceedings for the formulation of a rule
may be required, as a condition to judicial review, to first petition the agency to amend, modify, or
repeal. See Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1049-51 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
scope of review of the agency action in refusing relief is then governed by the "arbitrary and
capricious" test of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 513 F.2d at 1051. On the other hand, cases subject
to the formal hearing procedures of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1976), will entitle the petitioner to the
allegedly more exacting "substantial evidence" test on judicial review. Aircraft Owners & Pilots
Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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policies can generate. These devices are: (1) authorizing agencies to
grant waivers from their rules; and (2) allowing judicial review of peti-
tions to amend or repeal rules. Neither device is new or original. The
Supreme Court has sanctioned the waiver approach,68 and Congress
has specifically provided for waivers in the recent Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.69  The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has, in a number
of cases, indicated that agencies must seriously consider petitions to
amend or repeal its rules and that refusals to amend or repeal are sub-
ject to judicial review.70
A. The Waiver Approach.
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.71 the Supreme Court
took a surprisingly liberal approach to the power of an agency to waive
compliance with its rules. The rules at issue were Federal Communica-
tions Commission regulations disqualifying persons having an owner-
ship interest in five broadcasting facilities from receiving additional
permits. 72 The Court rejected Storer's argument that it was entitled to
a trial-like hearing at which its multiple-ownership status would be
only one of the considerations in deciding whether to grant the permit.
The agency's regulations allowing petitions for waiver of the rules73
were sufficient to allow the applicant to argue that it should be granted
an application despite the multiple ownership. 4
The Storer Broadcasting opinion's assurances that the waiver regu-
lation would satisfy Storer's rights to a "full hearing" under the stat-
68. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(g)(1), (2) (1976). These subsections provide:
(g)(1) Any person to whom a rule under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section applies may
petition the Commission for an exemption from such rule.
(2) If, on its own motion or on the basis of a petition under paragraph (I), the Commis-
sion finds that the application of a rule prescribed under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this
section to any person or class [of] persons is not necessary to prevent the unfair or decep-
tive act or practice to which the rule relates, the Commission may exempt such person or
class from all or part of such rule. Section 553 of title 5 shall apply to action under this
paragraph.
Id.
70. See Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Geller v. FCC, 610
F.2d 973, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ASG Indus. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1323,
1330 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); Laminators Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406,411 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1977). At least one eminent scholar
has previously endorsed this procedure. See Auerbach, supra note 3, at 16.
71. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
72. Id. at 193, 194 n.l. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.240, .35, .636 (1953).
73. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.361(c), 1.702 (1953), reprinted in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192, 201 n.10 (1956).
74. 351 U.S. at 205.
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ute75 indicates that applications for amendment, repeal, or waiver
should not be taken lightly, and that the agency should carefully con-
sider the arguments, grounds, and circumstances advanced in support
of the waiver.76 The waiver provision is a trade-off for the agency's
ability to avoid a trial-type hearing by having a bright-line rule that
disqualifies an applicant on the basis of a factor that would almost al-
ways disqualify him even if there was such a hearing. A party may be
affected by the rule in a way not contemplated by the drafters, and the
agency is obliged to provide a procedure through which that party may
seek to be excused from compliance.
A system of waivers from regulations, however, entails two major
defects. First, the objectives of the regulatory program may be im-
paired by a dispensation granted pursuant to views through lenses that
show only the needs of the waiver applicant and that may not reveal
collateral consequences that might undermine the regulatory scheme.
Experience at the local government level with zoning variances illus-
trates the subversive and uneven results that such a system can pro-
duce. 77 The second defect is based on considerations of fairness.
Under a waiver procedure, it is possible for a shrewd waiver applicant
to acquire a ruinous competitive advantage by receiving a dispensation
in a proceeding at which his economic adversaries had no real opportu-
nity to appear. For these reasons, the waiver approach appears to have
only limited utility.78
B. More Intensive Consideration to Applications for Amendment,
Modfcation, or Repeal of Rules.
A rule allowing petitions to be submitted to the agency to amend,
modify, or repeal regulations and providing judicial review of the
agency's disposition of a petition would provide an avenue of review to
those otherwise foreclosed by incontestability clauses and would avoid
the two major defects of a waiver system. If an objector must petition
for modification rather than seek a waiver, the agency will be en-
couraged to consider fully all policies relevant to the modification or
75. Id.
76. Id. at 202-05.
77. See Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board ofAdjstment: A Case Study in Misrule,
50 Ky. Li. 273, 324-39 (1962); Newbern, Zoning Flexibility- Bored ofAdjustment?, 30 ARK. L.
REv. 491, 510-11 (1977); Shapiro, he Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive
in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969).
78. An additional problem is presented by the functional equivalence of a rules waiver to a
license; both grant permission to engage in an activity otherwise prohibited. All of the subtle due
process complexities with which the courts have dealt in attempting to ensure fairness to license
applicants and their competitors are, sooner or later, bound to surface under such a system.
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repeal issue. When only an application for a waiver is pending, how-
ever, the agency may give undue weight to the needs of the individual
applicant. Whereas granting waivers can cause such uneven applica-
tion of the rule that the original policy goals may become seriously
subverted, positive response to a petition for amendment, modification,
or repeal of a rule applies to all covered by the rule. The unfair advan-
tage granted to a successful waiver applicant is also thereby avoided.79
The facts of Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.80 may be used to illus-
trate the difference between the two procedures. Had Nova Scotia ap-
plied for and been granted a waiver from the Food and Drug
Administration's fish-smoking rule, it would have had a distinct com-
petitive advantage over all other processors of whitefish who, in the
absence of waivers, would still be subject to the rule. On the other
hand, had Nova Scotia petitioned for and been granted an amendment
or modification of the rule that recognized the particular problems of
processing whitefish, all whitefish processors would receive the same
advantage.
In several cases in which it has aflirmed dismissals of suits chal-
lenging agency regulations outside the limited pre-enforcement review
period, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
indicated the availability of a petition to amend directed to the agency
as a means of obtaining review of the regulation.8' For example, in
Laminated Safety Glass Association v. Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission82 the court endorsed the petition-to-amend procedure as a way
of accommodating the discovery of new information by the petitioner
after the end of the sixty-day review period.83 In Investment Company
Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System84 the court
described what would constitute the administrative record for purposes
of reviewing an agency's denial of a petition to amend,85 and stated
79. When the amendment has the effect of providing a waiver to a particular person or class,
the distinction between an amendment and a waiver may appear more formal than real. But any
other person or group that can fit itself into the language of the modification enjoys the benefits of
the amendment without the need for special application.
80. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
81. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Laminated
Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf.
Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Nader had not
participated in the review of the regulations before their enactment and thus the denial of his
petition to amend was properly appealable to the court of appeals).
82. 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
83. Id. at 411.
84. 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
85. Judge McGowan stated: "The administrative record for review would include the infor-
mation and affidavits submitted to the agency by the aggrieved party, the record of any hearings
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that the proper standard of review was the "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" stan-
dard.86
Dean Auerbach of the University of Minnesota and Professor Wil-
liams of the University of Colorado have called for the petition to
amend or repeal, with judicial review and remand to the agency of
cases involving unsatisfactory responses, as the wisest and most accept-
able means of dealing with situations in which a literal application of
rules produces unwarranted results. 87
Judicial review of the considerations moving the agency to deny a
requested amendment or repeal of a rule is a fairer and more efficient
method of correcting a perceived injustice than the waiver approach.
Agency response to an application for amendment or repeal will more
likely consider collateral responsibilities within the agency's concern
than will the response to a waiver petition, when the agency focus tends
to confine itself to the predicament of the applicant. Moreover, a judi-
cial disapproval on appeal of the administrative denial of the request
ordinarily results in a remand to the agency, whereas in deciding the
propriety of a waiver denial, some judges may be tempted to deal with
the merits, thereby undercutting the agency's responsibility to deal with
collateral considerations that frequently are not central to the waiver
request. 88
It was this concern for the integrity of the administrative process
that prompted Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Addison v.
Holly Hill Food Co. ,89 to remand to the agency, for reformulation, an
ultra vires rule. Although the decision created a risk of retroactive law-
making by the agency, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that to invalidate
or reinterpret the rule without agency participation would be a usurpa-
tion by the Court of a responsibility that Congress had confided to the
agency.90
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of rule-incontestability clauses, which courts sometimes
imply in pattern 4 statutes9 and which Congress explicitly provides in
on the matter, and the Board's response (which might incorporate by reference the record of the
original rulemaking proceeding)." Id. at 1281.
86. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976)).
87. See Auerbach, supra note 3, at 16, 61-68; Williams, "hybridRulemaking" under the Ad.
ministrative Procedure Act, 42 U. CHi. L. RaV. 401, 424-25 (1975).
88. See Spence v. B & 0 Ry., 360 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 946 (1966).
89. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
90. Id. at 619-22.
91. See text accompanying notes 23-37 supra.
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pattern 5 statutes, 92 invites a constitutional confrontation over the con-
tinued validity of the controversial Yakus decision. Recent cases have
avoided this confrontation only by characterizing the administrative
pronouncements under consideration as not within the class of rules
that Congress intended to be incontestable. 93
The congressional desire for certainty and predictability concern-
ing the validity of agency regulations may be accommodated with the
goal of fairness to those affected by the regulations by permitting chal-
lenges to rules in enforcement proceedings only if the respondent can
show that he is materially aggrieved by the alleged defect. As in cases
dealing with the question of the propriety of a stay,94 or the question
whether the traditional exhaustion requirement 95 should be dispensed
with, a court gauging the intensity of the aggrievement would consider
a number of relevant factors, including the relative impairment of gov-
ernmental objectives. The respondent would obviously have a heavy
burden to carry.
Whether or not agency regulations are incontestable in enforce-
ment proceedings, aggrieved persons should be permitted to petition
the agency to amend, modify, or repeal regulations and to appeal the
agency's denial of the petition to the district court unless a statute pro-
vides for review in another court.96 A petition-to-amend procedure
avoids the problems of the waiver approach. If the aggrieved party is
required to seek an amendment or repeal, rather than a waiver, and if
the agency follows notice and comment procedures in making its deter-
mination, the danger that the administrative program may be impaired
92. See text accompanying notes 38-67 supra.
93. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600
F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
94. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n
v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
95. See note 37 supra.
96. Agencies that exercise rulemaking authority should adopt formal procedures for dispos-
ing of petitions to amend or repeal rules. The adoption of such procedures would not alter the
scope of review of the agency's decision; rather, it would assist the agency in appraising the facts
and circumstances involved in the particular applications of the rule to which the petitioners ob-
ject. The adoption of procedures for disposing of amendment petitions would also assist the
agency in refining or amending the rule so as to avoid anomalous applications without impairing
the adminstrative objectives of the rule. Procedures for disposing of amendment or repeal peti-
tions should include provisions for notice-and-comment procedures equivalent to those provided
for under section four of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). This would
provide some assurance that the agency would be advised of all the consequences of an amend-
ment or repeal. The person petitioning for the amendment or repeal will typically submit data
and arguments relevant only to his own situation thus creating a danger of adverse consequences
that were unforeseen at the time the petition was considered. The notice-and-comment proce-
dures would ensure the receipt of information and arguments representing a number of view-
points that might not otherwise reach the attention of the agency.
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in some unforeseen manner or that the petitioner will obtain an unfair
advantage over its competitors is greatly reduced. The availability of
appeal from the denial of an amendment petition permits judicial relief
when application of the rule would be contrary to the Constitution or
to congressionally-expressed policies or objectives.
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